Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

9-25-2008

Summary of ANSE, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex
rel. County of Clark, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74
Joanna M. Myers
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Myers, Joanna M., "Summary of ANSE, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Clark,
124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74" (2008). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 406.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/406

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

ANSE, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Clark,
124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74 (Sep. 25, 2008)1
CIVIL – RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTIONAL DEFECT
Summary
Petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying partial
summary judgment.
Disposition/Outcome
Denied the petition for writ of mandamus and affirmed the district court’s denial for
partial summary judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court held that subsequent owners of a “new
residence” under NRS 40.615 may seek residential construction defect remedies under NRS
Chapter 40 if instituted within the applicable statute of repose.
Factual and Procedural History
The real parties in interest initiated a construction defect action against Sun City
Summerlin’s developers, including petitioner Dell Webb Communities, Inc. alleging defects in
the exterior stucco of their residences. Real parties in interest sought remedies available under
NRS 40.600 through NRS 40.695. The action involved approximately 1200 residences in the
Sun City Summerlin community in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Dell Webb then instituted a third party action against several subcontractors including
ANSE, Inc., MS Concrete Company, Pratte Development Company, Inc., and Dean Roofing,
Inc., petitioners herein.
Petitioners moved the district court for partial summary judgment asserting that because
approximately 700 of the residences were occupied as dwellings prior to the subsequent owners
obtaining title, the residences are not “new” residences under NRS 40.615 and are not subject to
actions for constructional defects under NRS Chapter 40. Petitioners relied on the definition of a
“new residence” set forth by the Nevada Supreme Court in Westpark Owners’ Ass’n v. Dist. Ct. 2
In Westpark, the court determined a “new residence” is “a product of original construction that
has been unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction until the point of
sale.’”3 The district court denied the motion for partial summary judgment and petitioners filed a
petition for mandamus relief.
The Court exercised its discretion to consider the petition because petitioners may gain a
direct benefit from issuance of a writ of mandamus and because the petition raised an important
legal issue requiring clarification with regard to the definition of “new residence” set forth in
Westpark.
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Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court in Westpark defined “new residence” to mean “a product of
original construction that has been unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its
construction until the point of sale.” 4 Relying on this definition, petitioners argued that homes
which have not been continuously owned by the original purchasers do not qualify as a “new”
residence. Accordingly, petitioners asserted that subsequent owners are precluded from seeking
remedies under NRS Chapter 40, herein approximately 700 homes, because when a home has
had multiple owners, the homes were not unoccupied from the date of completion to the most
recent and latest sale.
The court responded by stating that petitioner’s expansion of the Westpark definition of
“new residence” ignored the unique factual background of Westpark , violated the purpose of the
statute, and lead to unreasonable and absurd results. In addition, the petitioner’s interpretation
significantly diminishes the statute’s remedies and protections to homeowners and developers by
forcing parties to resolve disputes outside the statutory scheme, conflicting with the statute’s
intent and affecting nearly 60 percent of the residences in this case.
The court determined petitioner’s definition of “new residence” would produce
unreasonable results. For example, the second owner of a one-year old residence would be
precluded from seeking a remedy for a constructional defect because he is not the first owner. A
neighbor who is the original purchaser of an identical residence could seek remedies under NRS
Chapter 40 for the same type of defect. The court further explains petitioner’s definition would
result in disparate treatment among similarly situated homeowners. NRCP 25(c) provides an
action may be “continued by or against the original party” in case of any transfer of interest,
therefore providing that subsequent homeowners could maintain a course of action so long as the
original purchaser initiated it. 5 However, subsequent owners could not obtain NRS Chapter 40
remedies if the defect had not been discovered previously by the original purchaser.
The court explained that Westpark is factually distinguishable from the present action
because it involved the distinct situation when, before its first sale, a residence is occupied as a
dwelling. In Westpark, condominiums were leased as apartments and occupied as dwellings for
as long as seven years prior to being offered for sale.6 The court concluded that to classify such
residences as “new” under NRS Chapter 40 would be erroneous.7
The court therefore rejects the petitioner’s expanded meaning of “new residence” and
clarifies that, as Westpark implied, a residence is considered “new" for constructional defect
purposes if it is a “product of original construction that has been unoccupied as a dwelling from
the completion of its construction until its original sale.” 8 Thus, subsequent owners are not
precluded from seeking NRS Chapter 40 remedies if the residence meets the aforementioned
requirement. The court underscores that this definition is in harmony with NRS 40.610 which
does not expressly require a claimant be the first owner and defines a constructional defect
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claimant simply as “[a]n owner of a residence.” The fact that a homeowner may not be the
original owner does not preclude the owner from seeking remedies under NRS Chapter 40 if the
home remained unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction to the point of
the first sale.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court clarified that “new residence” under NRS 40.615 is “a
residence that has remained unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction to
the point of its first sale.”9 In order for the term “new residence” to operate in harmony with the
legislature’s intent, subsequent owners of that residence may seek NRS Chapter 40’s residential
constructional defect remedies provided the action is brought within the applicable statute of
repose.10 The court therefore denied the petition for a writ of mandamus and affirmed the district
court’s denial of partial summary judgment.
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